

Message Text

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70

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-11 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1356

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T VIENNA 0655

FROM US REP MBFR

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: TEXT OF TACTICS PAPER

BEGIN SUMMARY: FOR EASE OF REFERENCE WE ARE TRANSMITTING THE
TEXT OF THE TACTIC PAPER AS IT EMERGED FROM THE JANUARY
23 AHG DISCUSSION. THIS TEXT INCLUDES THE AMENDMENTS WHICH
THE UK REP (ROSE) AGREED TO SUBMIT TO HIS AUTHORITIES IN LONDON.
END SUMMARY. BEGIN TEXT:

1. TO SUPPLEMENT PRESENTATIONS OF THE ALLIED PHASE I PROGRAM
IN PLENARY SESSIONS, THE ALLIES IN VIENNA WOULD, WHILE CONTINUING
TO REMAIN WITHIN THE LIMITS OF C-M(73)83 REVISED, FOLLOW
THE TACTIC OF SEEKING TO PROBE HINTS OF POSSIBLE SOVIET WILLINGNESS
TO DISCUSS A TWO-PHASE NEGOTIATION IN ORDER TO BRING THE SOVIETS
TO DEFER, IF ONLY TEMPORARILY, FOR THE PRACTICAL

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PURPOSE OF BEGINNING DISCUSSION AT SOME SPECIFIC POINT,

THEIR INTEREST IN COVERAGE OF NON-US NATO FORCES, AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES.

2. TO THIS END, THE ALLIES WOULD SEEK AN INFORMAL UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SOVIETS THAT THE PROCESS OF EAST-WEST DISCUSSION, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM UNILATERAL PRESENTATIONS, WOULD BEGIN BY TALKING ABOUT US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES. THE PROPOSED UNDERSTANDING WOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE SOVIETS AS A LIMITED PROCEDURAL ONE, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OR ACCEPTANCE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE PROGRAM OF EITHER SIDE.

3. THIS STEP IS DESIGNED TO OPEN THE WAY FOR DETAILED DISCUSSION OF, AND EXPLORATION OF EASTERN ATTITUDES TOWARD, THE ENTIRE PHASE I WESTERN NEGOTIATING PROGRAM, INCLUDING ITS REDUCTION COMPONENT, THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND STABILIZING MEASURES, AND AS THE FIRST MOVE IN A GRADUAL PROCESS OF BRINGING THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT THE WESTERN APPROACH AS THE BASIS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

4. TO ACHIEVE THE UNDERSTANDING DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 2, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE NECESSARY FOR THE ALLIES (WITHOUT OFFERING ANY SPECIFIC COMMITMENT FROM THEIR SIDE) TO INDICATE READINESS TO DISCUSS AT A LATER STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THE TIMING OF PHASE II, TO OFFER SOME SLIGHTLY CLEARER RE-AFFIRMATION OF THEIR INTENTION THAT NON-US NATO FORCES WOULD BE COVERED IN PHASE II IN THE EVENT OF A SUCCESSFUL PHASE I, AND TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH 6 BELOW.

5. THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES WOULD TELL THE SOVIETS THAT, AT A SUITABLE TIME LATER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIES WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE OF A PROVISION IN THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD COVER THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES. THIS POINT IS IMPLICIT IN WHAT THE ALLIES HAVE ALREADY SAID TO THE SOVIETS. IF PRESSED FURTHER ON THE TIMING OF THE SECOND PHASE, THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES COULD, IF THE AD HOC GROUP CONSIDERED THAT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIED IT, STATE THEIR VIEW THAT SECOND- PHASE NEGOTIATIONS COULD START "WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME" AFTER CONCLUSION OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT

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ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, WITH THE DURATION OF THAT FIXED PERIOD TO BE AGREED LATER IN THE PHASE I NEGOTIATIONS DURING DISCUSSION OF THE PROVISION ALREADY REFERRED TO. THE PHRASE "A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME" IS DELIBERATELY INDEFINITE; ITS DEFINITION IS OPEN FOR SUBSEQUENT ALLIED DECISION, WHICH WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE NEED FOR SATISFACTORY IMPLEMENTATION OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT.

5. THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY SEEK FIRMER ASSURANCES THAT THE SECOND PHASE WOULD ACTUALLY INCLUDE EUROPEAN NATO FORCES. IF SO, THE ALLIES MIGHT, STILL WITHOUT GOING INTO THE ACTUAL COMPOSITION OF PHASE II, TELL THE SOVIETS THAT, FOLLOWING A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, THE REDUCTION TO THE COMMON CEILING WHICH SHOULD RESULT FROM PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD, ON THE ALLIED SIDE, FOCUS ON THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE FOCUS LANGUAGE IS TAKEN FROM THE AGREED ALLIED POSITION PAPER. IF THE SOVIETS PERSIST IN ASKING WHETHER "OTHER FORCES" WOULD INCLUDE THE BUNDESWEHR. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES COULD REPLY THAT THEY ENVISAGE THAT NEGOTIATIONS IN PHASE II TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING WOULD ON THE ALLIED SIDE INCLUDE REDUCTIONS IN THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA IN WHICH REDUCTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE, AND THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IS AMONG THE ALLIES DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

7. IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET QUESTIONS ON INCLUSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES, THE ALLIES COULD SAY THAT THEIR MAIN INTEREST WAS IN GETTING AN ACTIVE DIALOGUE STARTED ON THE SUBJECT OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES. THEY MAINTAINED THEIR KNOWN VIEWS AGAINST INCLUSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. HOWEVER, BY AGREEING NOW TO DISCUSS US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES AS PROPOSED BY THE ALLIES, THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT BE FOREGOING THEIR RIGHT IN THE JUNE 28 COMMUNIQUE TO RAISE SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO THEM.

8. IF THE SOVIETS PRESSED FOR FURTHER ASSURANCES ON THESE POINTS, THEY WOULD BE REMINDED THAT THE ALLIES WERE SEEKING ONLY A LIMITED AND STRICTLY PROCEDURAL UNDERSTANDING WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE VIEWS OF EITHER SIDE ON SUBSTANCE AND THAT A SMALL STEP OF THIS KIND MERITED NO MORE CLARIFICATION THAN THE ALLIES HAD GIVEN; HENCE, THE ALLIES WOULD GO NO FURTHER THAN
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THE POINTS ALREADY MADE. HUMES

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